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TRADING ON CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMATION-CHIARELLA TAKES AN
ENCORE: UNITED STATES v. NEWMAN
Rule 10b-5, 1 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934,2 prohibits fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.' Because the rule is broadly
drawn," and has been interpreted to encompass a wide variety of
novel or atypical schemes,5 the extent of its proscriptions has been
the subject of much litigation.6 In Chiarella v. United States,7 for
instance, the Supreme Court considered whether a market insider,8
1 17 C.F.R. 9 240.10b-5 (1981).
2 15 U.S.C. 9 78j(b) (1976). Section 10(b) was enacted under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, ch. 404, tit. I, §§ 1-15, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78o (1976)), as
part of a reform program designed to correct the abuses in the securities industry believed
to have contributed to the stock market crash of 1929, see SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1969); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1934). For a discussion of the legislative history of
section 10(b), see Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative
Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 654 (1962).
' Rule lob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to de-
fraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981).
" See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); United States v. Charnay,
537 F.2d 341, 346-48 (9th Cir. 1976); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 800-02 (5th Cir.
1970).
5 See, e.g., Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 1973); Cant v.
A.G. Becker & Co., 374 F. Supp. 36, 46 (N.D. II. 1974); Carpental v. Hall, 311 F. Supp.
1099, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
Rule 10b-5 has been the most extensively litigated securities regulation. SEC v. Na-
tional Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969).
445 U.S. 222 (1980), rev'g 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978).
' The term "market insider" refers to one who has access to market information by
virtue of his strategic position in an entity which plays a key role in market transactions,
such as a law firm, bank, investment banking company, or financial printing company.
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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who had traded on confidential information concerning impending
tender offers, was criminally liable for such conduct under rule
10b-5.' Finding for the defendant, the Chiarella Court held that
liability could not be premised upon a mere failure to disclose ma-
terial nonpublic information, absent the existence of a duty to dis-
close arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.1" The
Court declined to decide a related proposition, namely, whether an
employee owes to his employer a duty, under rule 10b-5, not to
misappropriate confidential information.1 Nonetheless, in United
States v. Newman, 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit recently concluded, on facts analogous to those in
Chiarella,3 that a criminal violation of rule 10b-5 may be estab-
lished by a breach of an agent's duty to respect client
confidences.14
' 445 U.S. at 224. The defendant, Chiarella, was employed as a "markup man" by
Pandick Press, a financial printing house. Id. In the course of his duties, he was afforded
access to various documents relating to corporate takeovers. Id. Although the true names of
the companies involved were disguised in order to preserve confidentiality, on five occasions
Chiarella was able to detect the names of target companies, purchase stock in them prior to
public announcement of the takeovers, and sell his shares at a profit. Id. An SEC investiga-
tion uncovered Chiarella's activities, and resulted in a consent decree requiring Chiarella to
make restitution to the sellers of the stock. Id. Subsequently, he was indicted and convicted
for willful violation of rule 10b-5. Id. at 225. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction,
holding that Chiarella was a "market insider," that is, someone who had regular access to
material nonpublic information and thereby incurred a duty to disclose or to refrain from
trading. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365-66 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
In a 6-to-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, rejecting the "market
insider" approach. The Court held that the mere possession of material nonpublic informa-
tion did not give rise to a duty to disclose. 445 U.S. at 229. Rather, the imposition of liabil-
ity under rule lob-5 for nondisclosure depends upon "a duty to disclose arising from a rela-
tionship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction." Id. at 230. Since there
was no fiduciary relationship between Chiarella and the sellers of the target companies' se-
curities, the Court concluded that Chiarella did not violate rule lob-5 by trading. Id. at 231.
'0 445 U.S. at 227. The Supreme Court found that Chiarella was not in a relationship of
trust or confidence with the sellers of the target companies' securities which would give rise
to a duty to disclose, and therefore his silence was not fraudulent. Id. at 232. The Court
noted that Chiarella "was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger
who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions." Id. at 232-33.
" Id. at 235-37.
.2 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
'3 The district court remarked that the "faithless employees" in Newman were "the
counterparts to that equally faithless printer, Chiarella." United States v. Courtois, [1981]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,024, at 91,290 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 1981), rev'd sub noma. United
States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
" 664 F.2d at 16.
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The indictment in Newman alleged a scheme among five per-
sons:15 Antoniu and Courtois, employees of two prominent Wall
Street investment banking companies; 16 Newman, a securities
trader and manager of the over-the-counter trading department of
a New York brokerage firm;17 and two other persons, Carniol and
Spyropoulos.1 s The government charged that, between 1973 and
1978, Antoniu and Courtois misappropriated, from their respective
employers, confidential, nonpublic information concerning impend-
ing takeovers and acquisitions, and secretly conveyed this informa-
tion to Newman, Carniol, and Spyropoulos. 1' Using secret foreign
bank accounts and Bahamian trust accounts, Newman and the
others arranged to purchase stock in the prospective target compa-
nies.20 Once the takeover plans were made public, and the price of
the stock had risen, the stock was sold, and the profits shared
among the coconspirators.21
As in Chiarella, the Department of Justice alleged that the
defendants' conduct in misappropriating and trading on confiden-
tial information constituted criminal violations of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.22 Rather than charging the defendants with a fail-
I' The indictment named four of the five alleged coconspirators as defendants: James
Mitchell Newman, E. Jacques Courtois, Jr., Franklin Carniol, and Constantine Spyropoulos.
Id. at 14-15. Newman was the only party within the jurisdiction of the district court and
thus was the only party to the district court proceedings. Id. at 15. Courtois, Carniol, and
Spyropoulos left the United States, and were, at the time of the indictment, the subjects of
extradition attempts by the government. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 98,024, at 91,287
n.1. The Second Circuit observed, however, that the allegations of the indictment referred to
all of the defendants. 664 F.2d at 15.
The fifth coconspirator, Adrian Antoniu, was not indicted. Id. He chose to cooperate
with the government and plead guilty to two counts of an information charging him with
securities fraud in violation of rule 10b-5. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, app. at
A35-54 (2d Cir. 1981).
16 Antoniu and Courtois were employed by the investment banking firms of Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc. (Morgan Stanley) and Kuhn Loeb & Co. (Kuhn Loeb). 664 F.2d at 15.
17 Brief for United States at 4, United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
is Carniol, a resident of Belgium, purportedly used secret Luxembourg bank accounts
to trade on the information Antoniu leaked to him. Id. at 5. Spyropoulos, a Greek citizen
living in Greece and France, apparently used Swiss bank accounts to avoid detection. Id.;
see 664 F.2d at 15.
9 664 F.2d at 15.
20 Id.
', Id. The indictment did not indicate the amount of money involved in the transac-
tions or the amount of profits that the defendants had realized. In its brief, however, the
government represented that Antoniu and the defendants "reaped profits conservatively es-
timated at hundreds of thousands of dollars." Brief for United States at 7, United States V.
Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
22 664 F.2d at 15-16.
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ure to disclose, however, the government alleged that the gravamen
of the violation was the fraud which had been perpetrated through
Antoniu's and Courtois' breach of the fiduciary duties s owed to
their employers, their employers' corporate clients, and the clients'
shareholders.24
On Newman's motion, the district court dismissed all counts
of the indictment as to Newman,2 5 based upon its conclusion that
Newman had not received adequate notice that his allegedly crimi-
nal activities fell within the ambit of rule 10b-5's proscriptions. 26
Judge Haight, authoring the Newman district court opinion, rea-
soned that, at the time of the defendants' activities, there was no
clear indication in the law that rule 10b-5 extended to a non-in-
sider's violation of a fiduciary duty owed to an acquiring corpora-
tion in a tender offer.27
"' The indictment alleged that Antoniu and Courtois owed the fiduciary duties of "hon-
esty, loyalty and silence," and more specifically, the duty to "maintain the confidentiality of
material, confidential information provided to them in trust and confidence by their em-
ployers and their employers' clients." Indictment at V 10(c), No. S81 Cr. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The indictment charged that they affirmatively misled their employers by, inter alia, failing
to report the buyers' trading to their employers as required and by "falsely and fraudu-
lently" asserting that they maintained no direct or indirect interest in securities trading
accounts. Id.
2 Id. Since the indictment was based on Antoniu's and Courtois' breach of the fiduci-
ary duties stemming from their employee status, the liability of the other defendants was
predicated upon the theories of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976) and aiding and
abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976). [1981] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) V 98,024, at 91,288. In
addition to the rule 10b-5 violations, the indictment charged the defendant with 13 counts
of mail fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), as well as one separate count of conspiracy to
violate the mail fraud statute and rule 10b-5. [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 9 98,024, at
91,288.
25 [1981] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,024, at 91,301.
26 Id. at 91,296. In order to satisfy the fifth amendment due process guarantee of "no-
tice," a criminal statute or regulation such as rule 10b-5 must sufficiently -'afford fair warn-
ing to persons prosecuted under the statute that the conduct for which they could be con-
victed had been a crime." United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. 788, 796 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 have withstood the challenge that they are so broad and am-
biguous as to be unconstitutionally vague per se. See Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008,
1013 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 287-88 (2d Cir. 1975); United
States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. at 796. But see United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1377
(2d Cir. 1980) (Meskill, J., dissenting). A particular interpretation of the statute, however,
may be unconstitutional, because "some courses of conduct may be so close to the perimeter
of the acts proscribed by [section 10(b)] and Rule lOb-5 that it would be unconstitutional to
prosecute persons committing those acts." United States v. Pray, 452 F. Supp. at 796. Judge
Meskill, dissenting in Chiarella, maintained that "the 'clear and definite statement of the
conduct proscribed' to which . . . a defendant is entitled, must emanate from the language
of the statute itself, from prior judicial interpretation, or from established custom and us-
age." 588 F.2d at 1377 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
2 United States v. Courtois, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 98,024, at 91,296, rev'd
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the in-
dictment charged an actionable violation of rule 10b-5.2" Writing
for a panel divided on the rule 10b-5 issue,29 Judge Van Graafei-
land expressly adopted the theory left open by Chiarella, and
found that a violation of an employee's duty to respect. client confi-
dences30 gave rise to a transgression of rule 10b-5 when the em-
ployee traded on the converted information." Judge Van Graafei-
land then turned to consider, and reject, three limitations on rule
10b-5 liability: the purchaser-seller limitation, the fraud or deceit
requirement, and the "in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities" requirement.32
sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
25 664 F.2d at 16, 20.
29 The panel consisted of Circuit Judges Van Graafeiland and Newman, and District
Judge Dumbauld of the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. Judge
Dumbauld filed a separate opinion concurring in the reversal of the mail fraud counts and
dissenting as to reversal of the dismissal of the rule 10b-5 counts. In his dissent, Judge
Dumbauld explained that in view of the recent Supreme Court trend to confine section
10(b) "to practices harmful to participants in actual purchase-sale transactions," he pre-
ferred to uphold the indictment on the "more solid ground" that the defendants' conduct
had clearly violated the mail fraud statute. Id. at 20-21 (Dumbauld, J., concurring and dis-
senting) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
30 The "breach of fiduciary duty" theory also was used to uphold the mail fraud indict-
ment. 664 F.2d at 19-20. Relying upon two of its recent holdings, United States v. Bronston,
658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) and United States v. Von Barta, 635 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1703 (1981), the court reaffirmed that a mail fraud violation could be
established when there is "'concealment by a fiduciary of material information which he is
under a duty to disclose to another under circumstances where the non-disclosure could or
does result in harm to another.'" 664 F.2d at 19 (quoting United States v. Bronston, 658
F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1981)).
The court also rejected the lower court's holding that a mail fraud indictment based
upon an employee's breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of "'direct, tangible, economic
loss to the victim, actual or contemplated.'" 664 F.2d at 20. Even if such proof were re-
quired, however, the court believed that it could be satisfied by the diminution in the value
of the confidential information caused by a loss of the secrecy surrounding impending
tender offers. Id.; see Abbott v. United States, 239 F.2d 310, 314 (5th Cir. 1956). The court
indicated that the misappropriation of confidential information would be almost inherently
prejudicial to the investment companies and their clients in the case of a contemplated
undisclosed tender offer. See 664 F.2d at 20.
31 See 664 F.2d at 16. Judge Van Graafeiland apparently espoused the alternative the-
ory expounded by Chief Judge Kaufman in the Second Circuit's Chiarella opinion. See id.
He noted that Judge Kaufman had declared that a "violation of an agent's duty to respect
client confidences was a clear transgression of Rule 10b-5 'where, as here, the converted
information both concerned securities and was used to purchase and sell securities.'" Id.
(quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1368 n.14).
22 664 F.2d at 17; see Ketchum v. Green, 557 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 940 (1977). See generally 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 1OB-5 §§ 38-40 (rev. ed.
1982]
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The court first addressed the question of whether the fraud
must be perpetrated upon the actual seller or buyer of securities in
order to impose criminal liability under rule 10b-5, and concluded
that no such requirement existed.33 Judge Van Graafeiland rea-
soned that this limitation is merely a judicially engrafted standing
requirement, applicable only to the implied private right of action
for damages under rule 10b-5.34 With respect to suits for injunctive
relief, however, the Newman court observed that several courts
had held that a plaintiff need not be a defrauded purchaser or
seller in order to be able to sue under the rule. 5 Thus, the court
concluded, the refusal of courts to imply such a standing require-
ment in injunctive suits should reasonably have alerted the defen-
dant to the possibility that courts would similarly opt to adhere to
the express language of rule 10b-5 in a criminal suit.36
With respect to the second limitation on the application of the
rule-the fraud or deceit requirement-the Newman court con-
cluded that the defendants' misappropriation of confidential infor-
mation 37 clearly constituted a fraud upon their employers 8 and
upon their employers' clients.3 9 Finally, addressing the "in connec-
1980).
33 664 F.2d at 17.
31 Id.; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975); Note,
Standing Under Rule 10b-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 75 MICH. L. REv. 413, 413-44 (1976).
31 664 F.2d at 17 (citing Kahan v. Rosensteil, 424 F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 950 (1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417 F.2d 433, 436 (6th Cir.
1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1967)); cf. Chiarel-
la v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 238n.* (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("the limitation on
the right to recover pecuniary damages in a private action identified in Blue Chip is not
necessarily coextensive with the limits of the rule itself").
36 664 F.2d at 17. Judge Van Graafeiland stated that because suits for injunctive relief
do not incorporate the purchaser-seller requirement, the "[a]ppellee reasonably should have
anticipated that in a criminal action the courts likewise would follow the language of the
Rule." Id. The court of appeals found, therefore, that the defendants had sufficient fore-
warning of the scope of the rule they were charged with violating. Id.
37 Id. The court stated that because the defendants "misappropriated-stole to put it
bluntly" valuable confidential information, their conduct unquestionably constituted a
fraud on Antoniu's and Courtois' employers and their clients. Id. (quoting Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
" 664 F.2d at 17. The court stated that "[b]y sullying the reputations of Courtois' and
Antoniu's employers as safe repositories of client confidences," Newman and his codefend-
ants had defrauded Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb "as surely as if they took their money."
Id.
39 Id. The court viewed the fraud on Morgan Stanley's and Kuhn Loeb's clients as the
artificial inflation of the target company stock prices when the clients' takeover plans had
been "keyed to target company stock prices fixed by market forces." Id.
1982] INSIDER TRADING
tion with" limitation, the Newman court noted that this phrase
had been flexibly construed to encompass deceptive practices
"touching" the sale of securities.40 Since the sole purpose of the
fraud in the instant case was to purchase shares of the target com-
panies, the court concluded that this nexus satisfied the "very ten-
uous" relationship required.41
The expansive interpretation of rule 10b-5 articulated in the
Newman decision is possessed of several advantages. By holding
that a breach of an agent's fiduciary duty constitutes an actionable
violation of the rule, the Second Circuit effectively added a new
weapon to the SEC's antifraud arsenal, thereby enabling it to po-
lice insider activities which otherwise would be unreachable under
Chiarella.4 2 Additionally, since Newman raises the specter of a po-
41 Id. at 18 (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971)). In Bankers Life, the Supreme Court enunciated the "touch" test, stating that, for
purposes of rule 10b-5 liability, it was sufficient that the seller "suffered an injury as a result
of deceptive practices touching its sale of securities as an investor." 404 U.S. at 12-13; see
Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722, 736 (2d Cir. 1972) (en banc); Jannes v. Microwave Com-
munications, Inc., 461 F.2d 525, 528-30 (7th Cir. 1972); 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND
FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 11.12 (rev. ed. 1979). The outer limits of the touch test have
never been defined, and courts have applied it on a case-by-case basis. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 595 (5th Cir. 1974); see, e.g., Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 157-
58 (3d Cir. 1973). See generally Note, The Controlling Influence Standard in Rule 10b-5
Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1007, 1013 (1973); Note, The Pendu-
lum Swings Further: The "In Connection With" Requirement and Pretrial Dismissals of
Rule 10b-5 Private Claim of Damages, 56 TEx. L. REV. 62, 73-76 (1977); Note, Securities
Regulation-Rule lOb-5-The Supreme Court's Holding in Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), May Force a Renewed Search for a Limit-
ing Doctrine for Rule lOb-5 Liability, 50 TEx. L. REV. 1273, 1276-82 (1972).
41 664 F.2d at 18 (quoting I A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD AND COM-
MODITIES FRAUD § 4.7(574)(3), at 88.34 (1979)).
4" The conduct involved in Newman and Chiarella, which related to information re-
garding tender offers, is now governed by rule 14e-3. Rule 14e-3 was promulgated in October
1980, subsequent to the activities of the Newman and Chiarella defendants, pursuant to
section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976). The Williams Act provisions
were drafted specifically to correct abuses in the area of tender offers. See United States v.
Courtois, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,024, at 91,291-92, rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Newman, 664 U.S. 12 (2d Cir. 1981); Hearings on S. 510 Before the Sen. Comm. on
Banking and Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) (statement of SEC Chairman
Budge). Rule 14e-3 provides:
If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to commence, or has com-
menced, a tender offer (the "offering person"), it shall constitute a fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of
the Act for any other person who is in possession of material information relating
to such a tender offer which information he knows or has reason to know is non-
public and which he knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from: (1) The offering person, (2) The issuer of the securities sought or
to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer, director, partner or employee
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tential criminal prosecution, with its attendant scandal, it is sug-
gested that employers engaged in servicing securities trading will
exert greater vigilance, adopt more sophisticated precautions, and
issue sterner warnings to their employees regarding confidential in-
formation.'3 Similarly, the decision may serve as a deterrent to
members of the securities trading community tempted by easy ac-
cess to potentially lucrative information." Indeed, the image of
more rigorous enforcement may serve to assuage the fears of the
investing public, whose faith in the integrity of the securities mar-
ket has been shaken by extensive publicity to the effect that the
or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or such issuer, to
purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities. . unless
within a reasonable time prior to any purchase or sale such information and its
source are publicly disclosed by press release or otherwise.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1981). See generally Note, Trading on Material Nonpublic Informa-
tion Under Rule 14e-3, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 539 (1981).
The Newman decision, however, is still of great significance because of its establish-
ment of the "fiduciary duty" principle under rule 10b-5. Since the application of rule 14e-3
is confined to the tender offer area, the Newman case is important because it articulates a
potential theory of liability under rule 10b-5, analogous to that created in rule 14e-3, for
wrongful conduct relating to other significant corporate transactions, such as mergers and
negotiated acquisitions. Brief for SEC at 4, United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1981) (amicus curiae).
'3 Interestingly, precautions had been taken by both Pandick Press, the financial print-
ing company that employed Chiarella, and by Morgan Stanley and Kuhn Loeb, the invest-
ment banking companies in the Newman case. The Chiarella case revealed that Pandick
Press had posted throughout the shop and above the time clock large boldface signs which
advised employees that confidential information was the property of the customer, forbade
them to use the information for their own or anyone else's benefit, warned them that viola-
tion of this rule would subject them to immediate dismissal and potential criminal penalties,
and required them to report any violations to their employer. United States v. Chiarella, 588
F.2d 1358, 1369 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 22 (1980). In Newman, the Kuhn Loeb and
Morgan Stanley employees were required to pledge that they would maintain the confidenti-
ality of the material entrusted to them, and to maintain no direct or indirect interest in
securities trading accounts. Indictment at 10(c), United States v. Newman, No. S81 Cr. 53
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
44 The use of criminal penalties to administer the securities laws raises the larger issue
of the function of criminal sanctions in the enforcement of economic regulatory legislation.
While some argue that it is unjust to send a violator to jail for an illegal but generally
known business practice, Ball & Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforce-
ment of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. Rav. 197, 198 (1965), soci-
ologists generally believe that fear of criminal prosecution acts as an effective deterrent to
businessmen, professional men, and the middle class, id. at 216. In view of such deterrent
effect, Professors Ball and Friedman have concluded that criminal sanctions should also be
highly effective in patrolling economic crimes. Id. Additionally, the threat of criminal prose-
cution may make noncriminal sanctions more effective. Id. See generally Kadish, Some Ob-
servations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U.
CH. L. REV. 423, 426 (1963).
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market is riddled with insider trading.4"
Notwithstanding such practical benefits, it is submitted that
the Newman decision is more significant than the court of appeals
acknowledges.46 By permitting the misappropriation of information
from acquiring companies to fulfill the fraud requirement of a rule
10b-5 violation, the Second Circuit has transformed an employee's
fiduciary obligations into the status of a new federal securities law
duty.47 Antoniu and Courtois unquestionably owed certain fiduci-
45 See SEC Chief Seeking to Reassure Investors, Says Insider-Trading Cases are Lim-
ited, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1981, at 10, col. 2. While the SEC had for some time publicized its
battles against insider trading, it was forced, by November 1981, to reassure investors that
insider trading affected "only a tiny fraction of the total volume of securities." Id. (state-
ment of SEC Chairman John Shad). But see 46 SEC ANN. REP. xi (1980) (concentrated
enforcement in the area of insider trading is "critical to the integrity of public securities
market").
46 While the Newman court phrased its opinion in terms of simply meeting the normal
requirements of a rule 10b-5 violation, see United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16-19 (2d
Cir. 1981), the ground-breaking impact of the decision is that it is the first case to recognize
the novel theory of rule 10b-5 liability based upon a defendant's breach of fiduciary duties
in misappropriating information-the theory left open by Chiarella. See Langevoort, In-
sider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
1, 49 (1982).
'I Rule 10b-5 does not expressly address liability for nondisclosure of nonpublic infor-
mation. See note 3 supra. Rather, the concept of a duty to disclose under the rule is the
result of judicial and administrative interpretation. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 3;
Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It Takes a Thief, 55 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 93, 94 (1980). In construing rule 10b-5, early courts made reference to com-
mon-law principles of fraud and deceit, and imposed liability for silence when there was a
fiduciary relationship between the parties giving rise to a "duty" to disclose. See Trussell v.
United Underwiters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 774 (D. Colo. 1964); Tobacco & Allied Stocks,
Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 143 F. Supp. 323, 331 (D. Del. 1956), aff'd, 244 F.2d 902 (3d Cir.
1957). The SEC and the courts extended the duty to insiders and tippees of insiders. See
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235-36 (2d Cir. 1974);
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). As the unfairness element of the cases
became more pronounced, see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 861-62
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), it appeared that the trend of
expansion might culminate in a rule 10b-5 duty to disclose whenever a party possessed ma-
terial inside information, premised upon a duty owed to the investing public. See Note, Rule
10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It Takes A Thief, supra, at 108-09.
The Chiarella Court rejected such a generalized duty, holding that Chiarella owed no duty
to the sellers from whom he purchased his stock because he was not in a fiduciary relation
with them. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227, 232-33 (1980). Justice Stevens
noted, however, that Chiarella owed a duty to the tender offerors and his employer. Id. at
238 (Stevens, J., concurring). Because disclosure would be detrimental to those to whom he
owed a duty of loyalty, this duty could not be fashioned in terms of a "disclose or refrain
from trading" rule, but rather had to be labelled a "duty of silence." Id. (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Justice Stevens suggested that breach of this duty might bring Chiarella within
rule 10b-5, but declined to decide whether such a securities duty should be recognized. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring).
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ary duties with respect to the information entrusted them by vir-
tue of their positions as agents of the investment banking firms,
and subagents vis-a-vis the tender offerors.4 8 They, therefore, were
prohibited from engaging in self-dealing, from placing themselves
in a position of conflict of interest, and from using for their own
advantage any of their principals' confidential information.49 Con-
cededly, the scheme alleged in the Newman indictment contra-
venes those common-law principles of agency duties. 50 Nonethe-
less, the propriety of the court's elevation of the breach of such
duties into a securities fraud is questionable. 51 'In this regard, the
courts generally have recognized that the reason for rule 10b-5 lia-
bility is the "inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of [nonpublic] information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing. '52 Thus, nondisclosure is penalized
in order to forestall overreaching in securities transactions.53 The
Newman court, however, in a theoretical move akin to applying the
concept of transferred intent54 and accomplished by a broad use of
48 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16; see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at
237. Having assumed to act under the control and for the benefit of its clients, Kuhn Loeb
and Morgan Stanley became the agents of the offering companies. See RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 14 (1958). Antoniu and Courtois, as trusted employees, were agents of the
investment banking companies, and thus were subagents with respect to the tender offerors.
See W. SEAVEY, AGENCY 10 (1964).
" See RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY §§ 388, 390, 393, 395 (1933).
50 See United States v. Courtois, [1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,024, at 91,296
(the employers and the acquiring companies were deprived of their agents' duty of loyalty
and ethical behavior), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
51 Determining whether the fraud falls within the contemplated scope of rule 10b-5 is a
dual-edged problem which may be couched either in terms of the substance of the "fraud"
or the "remoteness" of the security purchase. Courts have used both approaches to the same
end-to find the limits of liability under rule 10b-5. Compare O'Brien v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 63 (7th Cir. 1979) (breach of fiduciary or contractual
duties to investors does not rise to the level of a section 10(b) fraud) with Wilson v. First
Houston Inv. Corp., 566 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978) (the purchase and sale of securities
was too remote to bring wrongdoing within section 10(b)). At issue in both instances is the
reach of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
5' SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
83 See Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Federal Securities Regulation: A Brief Re-
view, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 311, 313-14 (1974); Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322, 334 (1979). See also
S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1934); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 153
(1934); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-4 (1933).
1 Under principles of tort law, if A harms B by an act intended for C, A may be held
liable for an intentional tort to B under the theory of transferred intent; the doctrine per-
mits the intent to harm one party to fulfill the intent to harm the person actually harmed.
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the "in connection with" requirement, permitted the wrongdoing
in the misappropriation of the confidential information to substi-
tute for the fraud in failing to disclose.5 5 The rationale of prevent-
ing overreaching was thus abandoned; yet the violation committed
by the defendants remains the same as in Chiarella-the purchase
of target company shares prior to public announcement of a tender
offer.5 6 Thus, it is suggested that the court's characterization of the
defendants' conduct as "fraud" is merely a means of circumventing
the Chiarella holding, but without the traditional rationale for rule
10b-5 liability.5
See Talmage v. Smith, 101 Mich. 370, 373-74, 59 N.W. 656, 657 (1894); Carnes v. Thompson,
48 S.W.2d 903, 904 (Mo. 1932). See generally Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEx. L. Rav.
650 (1967). In Newman, in order to fulfill the fraud theory and the underlying duty require-
ment of Chiarella, the court substituted "fraud on the source" of the information for fraud
on the investor. See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 46.
" See note 54 supra. The district court, in Newman, held that this substitution
brought the fraud outside of rule 10b-5, because it was not perpetrated on the employers
and the acquiring companies in their capacities as investors. United States v. Courtois,
[1981] FED. SEC. L. REP. T 98,024, at 91,296; accord, O'Brien v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 59 (7th Cir. 1979). In O'Brien, the plaintiffs, trustees of union and
employee pension trust funds, alleged a rule 10b-5 fraud by the defendant bank to whom
these funds were turned over for investment. 593 F.2d at 57. The bank, acting as agent and
trustee, hence assuming a fiduciary duty of due care, bought and sold stock for the benefit
of the trusts. Id. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the bank engaged in self-dealing for
its own benefit by purchasing securities issued by companies of which they were substantial
creditors without disclosing its conflict of interest or its adverse inside information. Id. In
finding that the breach of fiduciary duties did not constitute a rule 10b-5 violation, the court
noted that the "[p]laintiffs. . .could not and did not allege that they were induced to buy
or sell securities by the nondisclosures." Id. at 58. Rather, they "'were induced not to exer-
cise their respective powers to terminate the . . . contractual relationships' with [the
bank]." Id. But see Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 1Ob-5
and Insider Trading, 30 EMoRY L.J. 263, 301-03 (1981) (substitution of misappropriation
theory in place of pre-Chiarella duty to the marketplace may be the first step in reworking
and rethinking "the present nearly unintelligible, conceptually slippery, and counterproduc-
tive insider trading enforcement scheme").
516 See note 9 supra.
57 Since both the tender offeror and the defendants possessed the same knowledge of
the significant upcoming corporate event, the defendants' conduct was not overreaching
with respect to the acquiring companies. The SEC has maintained that, despite this distinc-
tion and despite the Chiarella holding that such persons owed no duty to the sellers of the
target company stock or to the marketplace, Newman-type practices fall within the general
policy concerns of rule 10b-5 because "such conduct undermines the integrity of, and inves-
tor confidence in, the securities markets." SEC Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980). In oppo-
sition to this policy basis for broad regulation of insider trading are the exponents of an
economic approach to the use of undisclosed material information in securities markets. See
Heller, Chiarella, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: "Fairness" versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus.
LAW. 517, 517 (1982). Economists have developed a capital market theory known as the
"Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis" (ECMH) which posits that insider trading increases
the flow of information to the market and thus improves market efficiency, and its ability to
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The Newman court's labelling of the defendants' conduct as
securities fraud under rule 10b-5 suffers from an additional con-
ceptual flaw. In order to bring the defendants' activities within the
scope of rule 10b-5, the court suggested that a rise in the value of a
target company's stock, precipitated by the defendant's trading,
could work to defraud the tender offeror by endangering its take-
over plans."' This formulation of fraud, however, presumes a
vested interest in the target company which merits protection by
rule 10b-5.5 9 It further presumes a right to confidentiality concern-
ing corporate activities that is shielded by rule 10b-5.10 Yet, it is
far from clear that an acquiring company has a protected interest
in the target of an incipient unannounced tender offer."1 Moreover,
reflect the "intrinsic value" of the securities. See Barry, The Economics of Outside Informa-
tion and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1308, 1330-54 (1981); Heller, supra, at 520-26; Note,
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Se-
curities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1073 (1977). Proponents of ECMH place a pre-
mium on the rapid dissemination of information to the securities markets. Notwithstanding
the ethical or moral difficulties of Chiarella-type conduct, such proponents contend that
investors as a whole derive the greatest benefit from disclosure of all information, and that
the integrity of the securities markets is greatest when prices of securities are based upon
the filtration of information, whether disclosed or undisclosed. Barry, supra, at 1134; Heller,
supra, at 531-32, 539-40. While generally recognizing the limitations on "inside" informa-
tion, economists have advocated the maximum exploitation of outside information and have
opposed SEC policies of market egalitarianism and "fairness." Barry, supra, at 1356.
" The Newman court described the detrimental effect of the defendants' conduct as
follows:
In a tender offer situation, the effect of increased activity in purchases of the tar-
get company's shares is, similarly, to drive up the price of the target company's
shares; but this effect is damaging to the offering company because the tender
offer will appear commensurately less attractive and the activity may cause it to
abort.
664 F.2d at 17-18 (quoting 13A B. Fox & E. Fox, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, CORPORATE Ac-
QUISITIONS AND MERGERS § 27.05[4] (1981)).
51 Cf. Langevoort, supra note 46, at 47 (inquiry required as to whether the source of the
information "would be regarded as within the class of persons intended to be protected by
section 10(b)"). Professor Langevoort indicates that this inquiry refers not only to standing
requirements in civil suits, but also to the scope of the rule. See id. at 47 n.191, 48 n.194.
"o See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 48 n.194 (discussing Scott, Insider Trading: Rule
10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 817-18 (1980)). Professor
Scott invoked the need to protect corporate privacy as a justification for the prohibition
against insider trading. Id. Under this proposal, a corporation should be protected from
trading which "feed[s] the 'rumor mill' surrounding the securities market," threatening
plans dependent on secrecy. Id.
61 Cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977) (Congress designed leg-
islation regulating tender offers in order to protect shareholders of target companies, not
tender offerors). In rejecting an attempt by a defeated tender offeror to bring a private suit
for damages under section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976), the Piper
Court explored the policy bases of tender offer regulation. See 430 U.S. at 27-37. Reviewing
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rule 10b-5 protection has not been extended so broadly that the
harm it prohibits may consist of an indirect disturbance of the nat-
ural securities market.2 The Newman court's description of the
the legislative history of tender offer provisions of the Williams Act, the Court noted testi-
mony describing takeover bidders as "corporate raiders" and "takeover pirates," id. at 28,
and emphasizing that the tender offeror has "'the resources and the arsenal of moves and
countermoves which adequately protect their interests,'" id. at 29. See also Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kuchel). The Piper Court concluded
that these remarks, along with other substantial indicia, indicated that Congress' primary
concern in drafting the legislation was the protection of investors, not tender offerors. 430
U.S. at 29-30. Therefore, the Court refused to imply a cause of action for the unsuccessful
tender offeror under section 14(e). Id. at 35. Moreover, in a related context, the interests of
the tender offeror have been deemed not worthy of protection. The management of the
target company of a hostile tender offer frequently will attempt to fend off the bidder by
seeking the aid of a more acceptable company, known as a "white knight," who will meet or
better the tender offeror's bid. Bloomenthal, The New Tender Offer Regimen, State Regu-
lation, and Preemption, 30 EmoRy L.J. 35, 36 (1981). Once a white knight enters the pic-
ture, the competing offerors may engage in a bidding war, driving the premium price of the
bids upward, or perhaps causing the withdrawal of the original bid. Id. at 45. Absent actual
market manipulation and collusion, the purchases and bidding of the white knight do not
violate SEC rules. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 794-96 (2d
Cir. 1969). Indeed, the SEC rules contemplate that there may be two or more competing
tender offers. Bloomenthal, supra, at 49; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1981). Moreover, Bloo-
menthal has summarized the net effect of the SEC's recently revised tender offer regulatory
program as providing the target company with a period of time in which to secure a better
(higher) price for its shareholders. Bloomenthal, supra, at 71. It is submitted that it is some-
what anomalous to characterize the injury causing liability under rule 10b-5 in terms of the
aims of the tender offer legislation, namely, higher prices for target company shareholders.
See also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1976) (bidder is
required to pay all shareholders the highest price offered during the course of tender offer
regardless of when the shares were tendered).
02 See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977). The securities markets
are inherently volatile, and susceptible to change based upon rumors, indications from large
blocks of trading, and the announcement of corporate information. See Heller, supra note
57, at 526-32. Indeed, the success of the Newman scheme depended on the inevitable rise in
the price of the target company stock as the market reacted to the public announcement of
the tender offer. See 664 F.2d at 15. Liability for affecting securities prices, however, is
extremely circumscribed by the requirement that the trader or disseminator of information
must have had the specific motive to manipulate prices. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 383 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The Santa Fe
Court observed that "'[m]anipulation' is 'virtually a term of art when used in connection
with securities markets.' The term refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched
orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting mar-
ket activity." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 476 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)). The trading of the Newman defendants in breach of
their fiduciary duties, albeit capable of affecting the price for target company shares, did not
constitute manipulation as contemplated by rule lob-5.
In Santa Fe, the Court considered whether certain breaches of fiduciary duties by cor-
porate management constituted fraud within the meaning of rule 10b-5. See 430 U.S. at
471-76. In the course of determining that the activities in question did not rise to the level
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injury suffered by the tender offeror, however, appears to be pre-
mised upon the tenuous notion that the tender offeror possessed a
right to purchase the target company stock in a natural securities
market unsullied by leaks of secrets or breaches of confidential-
ity.63 It is submitted that this rationale amounts, in essence, to the
"market insider" approach that was expressly rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Chiarella, an approach which was premised on the
notion of a natural securities marketplace requiring equal access to
information to remain "unsullied.
64
CONCLUSION
Foreclosed by Chiarella from imposing liability for nondisclo-
sure to the sellers of the target company stock, the Second Circuit
has pursued a new direction for rule 10b-5 which recognizes out-
sider liability based upon the theory of a "fraud on the source" of
the information. Despite the arguable need for a theory of liabil-
ity to address the type of misconduct left unchecked by Chiarel-
la,6 6 it is submitted that the Newman court's approach is inconsis-
of rule 10b-5 fraud, the Court remonstrated with the Second Circuit for its broad approach,
stating:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals would rely on the use of the term
'fraud' in Rule 10b-5 to bring within the ambit of the Rule all breaches of fiduci-
ary duty in connection with a securities transaction, its interpretation would...
'add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different from its com-
monly accepted meaning.'
Id. at 472 (citations omitted).
" The court found that Newman and "his cohorts also wronged Morgan Stanley's and
Kuhn Loeb's clients, whose takeover plans were keyed to target company stock prices fixed
by market forces, not artificially inflated through purchases by purloiners of confidential
information." 664 F.2d at 17.
" See 445 U.S. at 233. Compare United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1367 (2d Cir.
1978) ("Chiarella's market activity created an artificial demand for target stock that had a
distorting effect on the free play of market forces envisioned by the securities laws"), rev'd,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) with United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1981) (defen-
dants artificially inflated market prices by purchases). The Second Circuit's discussion of
the detrimental effects on the market suggests that its decision may have been premised, in
part, upon the theory rejected by the Supreme Court in Chiarella, namely that of a general
duty owed to the marketplace by virtue of market position. See 445 U.S. at 233.
11 See Langevoort, supra note 46, at 46.
66 See, e.g., Note, Rule 10b-5 and the Duty to Disclose Market Information: It Takes A
Thief, supra note 47, at 122. The SEC itself has attempted to thwart Chiarella-type con-
duct by the promulgation of rule 14e-3. See SEC Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980); note 42
supra. See also Steinberg, Fiduciary Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and
Tender Contests for Corporate Control, 30 EMORY L.J. 169, 174-76 & nn.7-9 (1981). See
generally Herlihy & Weir, Insiders, Outsiders: The Commission's Efforts to Outlaw Insider
Trading, in PROXY CONTESTS AND BATTLES FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 421 (Practicing Law
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tent with recent signals from the Supreme Court that the scope of
rule 10b-5 requires definition, not expansion. ° Thus, it appears
that the novel theory of liability fabricated in Newman may, ulti-
mately, fail to survive scrutiny by the Court.
Elizabeth M. DeCristofaro
Institute 1981). For criticism that the SEC's manner of adopting rule 14e-3 and the rule's
overbreadth may cause the same type of difficulties as regulation under rule 10b-5, see
Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119, 138-
41 (1981); Olson, SEC Rule on Tender Offers Nips Back at Chiarella, Legal Times of Wash-
ington, Oct. 20, 1980, at 19, col. 1.
67 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 736 (1975); cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) (court refused to expand scope of rule 10b-6). One com-
mentator has concluded that "[t]here can be little doubt about the intensity of the Court's
concern over the expansion of securities liability and its determination to curb." 4 A. BROM-
BERG, SECURITIES LAW-FRAUD § 2.4, at 384.2 (1977). But see Hazen, Symposium Introduc-
tion-The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the Pendulum Slowed?, 30 EMORY
L.J. 5, 6 (1981) (recent court decisions do not uniformly continue to restrict scope of securi-
ties laws).
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